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“I PRONOUNCE YOU MAN AND MAN. YOU MAY NOW FILE 
JOINTLY FOR BANKRUPTCY”: DOMA’S 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY AND ITS EFFECT ON JOINT 
BANKRUPTCY FILINGS FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES 
Michael S. Tomback∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Bankruptcy courts are no longer constrained by the mantra: “Bankruptcy 
is for Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve.” In 2013, Windsor v. United States 
marked the erosion of the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996. Post-Windsor, the 
operative definition sections of that Act—defining “marriage” and “spouse” 
for “any Act of Congress”—no longer control. The meaning of marriage and 
spouse under federal law and, specifically, the Bankruptcy Code is now 
unclear. This lack of clarity affects interpretation of important provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code that provide for joint bankruptcy filings. 
What is the outcome when lawfully married couples, same-sex couples in 
particular, file jointly for bankruptcy in a state that does not recognize their 
marriage? Now that the Defense of Marriage Act’s definitions no longer apply 
in the bankruptcy context, this Article argues that lawfully married same-sex 
couples should be allowed to file for bankruptcy jointly under 11 U.S.C. § 302 
in all bankruptcy courts, even if the couple files jointly in a state that does not 
recognize their union. Under federalism principles, the Bankruptcy Code 
 
 ∗ Law Clerk to the Honorable Ronald H. Sargis, Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of California; 
J.D., Emory University School of Law (2014). The author hopes that this Article provides same-sex couples 
the chance to have a fresh start. He would like to thank his family, friends, and colleagues for their continued 
support and encouragement. The author would like to thank John Barlow and Sarah O’Donohue for their input, 
critiques, and aid in drafting this Article. The author would like to specifically thank Professor Dorothy Brown 
and Professor Lesley Carroll for their constant support, insight, and push to complete this Article. The author 
hopes that the reader finds within the Article the same hope and optimism that he found in writing it. 
This summer, the Supreme Court is expected to decide Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). The 
disposition of Obergefell will likely affect the applicability of arguments set forth in this Article. However, this 
Article touches on much more than the issues at play in Obergefell—a case focused on the equal protection and 
due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This Article seeks to balance state sovereignty and federal authority in the context of marriage. The 
task of balancing tradition, fundamental rights, and federalism is as old as the Republic and will remain 
relevant in a bankruptcy context no matter how the Court rules in Obergefell. It is our hope that readers will 
find the following discussion informative and enlightening both before and after any anticipated rulings this 
summer. 
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should apply the definitions of marriage and spouse from the state of 
celebration to provide same-sex couples equal access to the federal bankruptcy 
system. 
While the full impact of Windsor on the Bankruptcy Code remains to be 
seen, this Article proposes an interpretive framework that permits same-sex 
couples to file for bankruptcy jointly in any state while leaving state-level 
restrictions on marriages between same-sex couples untouched. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Following the decision in United States v. Windsor,1 the Bankruptcy Code 
(the “Code”) is no longer limited to the narrow definitions of spouse and 
marriage in the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).2 The Code now allows 
for an interpretation that will give married same-sex couples3 equal access to 
the bankruptcy system.4 
The impact of Windsor5 has been, and will likely continue to be, felt in 
almost every field of law.6 The Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor sparked a 
major a shift towards equality for same-sex couples in the United States.7 Soon 
the Court will determine whether that shift is permanent.8 Practically speaking, 
the Windsor ruling correctly shifts the definition of marriage and marital rights 
back to the authority of the states under their police powers, subject to 
constitutional guarantees.9 This in turn opens the door for same-sex couples to 
enjoy the same rights and privileges as their heterosexual counterparts at the 
federal level.10 Windsor signals an important societal change towards equal 
 
 1 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013). 
 2 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 
(2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 3 This Article will adopt the assumption that, when speaking of a married same-sex couple, the marriage 
is legal and recognized in the couple’s state of celebration. This premise is necessary because the same-sex 
couple should have the same standing as heterosexual couples. 
 4 While some states have recognized civil unions, which grant same-sex couples similar rights to their 
heterosexual counterparts, for the purpose of this Article, same-sex marriage will be the focus. 
 5 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.  
 6 Some of these other areas of law include, but are not limited to, federal tax treatment, estate planning, 
choice-of law, etc. See LEON GABINET, TAX ASPECTS OF MARITAL DISSOLUTION §3:12 (2d ed., rev. 2012); 
Meghan V. Alter, The High Price for Leveling the Playing Field: The Socioeconomic Divide in Estate 
Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 25 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 32 (2011); William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice 
of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2012). 
 7 Since the Supreme Court decided Windsor and as of March 2, 2015, four circuit courts of appeals have 
struck down state bans on marriage between same-sex couples, leading to an exponential increase in the 
number of states that authorize performance and recognition of those marriages. See generally Latta v. Otter, 
771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 14-765), and 
petition for cert. filed sub nom., Idaho v. Latta, 83 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2015) (No. 14-788); Baskin v. 
Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 663 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 265 (2014). At this point, with those circuit court rulings intact, marriage between same-sex couples is 
legal in thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia. Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. 
(Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx.  
 8 See Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556 (U.S. argued Apr. 28, 2015). 
 9 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. 
 10 See, e.g., Implementing United States v. Windsor for Purposes of Entitlement and Enrollment in 
Medicare Hospital Insurance and Supplementary Medical Insurance, 80 Fed. Reg. 7975, 7975–76 (Feb. 13, 
2015) (citing Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416, 426, 426–1, 1395i–2, 1395p, 1395r (2012)), available at 
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rights for homosexual couples. Specifically, in the context of bankruptcy 
filings, the finding that DOMA’s definitions of spouse and marriage are 
unconstitutional allows married same-sex couples to avail themselves of a 
legal process long embedded in our nation’s history. 
Through DOMA, Congress imposed a federal limitation on the rights of 
same-sex couples and individuals in those same-sex relationships. Notably, and 
most importantly for this Article, DOMA defined marriage as “only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,” and spouse as 
“only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”11 1 U.S.C. 
§ 7, also known as § 3 of DOMA, broadly applied these definitions when 
“determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States.”12 Given the expansive language of 1 U.S.C. § 7, if there was an “Act 
of Congress” that used either the term marriage or spouse in the text, § 7 
definitions would apply.13 In bankruptcy, that meant that any use of spouse or 
marriage in the Code became limited to heterosexual couples. As a result, 
lawfully married same-sex couples were prevented from using the bankruptcy 
system for a “fresh-start.”14 For sixteen years, these definitions acted as a 
discriminatory ceiling, preventing married same-sex couples from enjoying the 
traditional rights and privileges enjoyed by their heterosexual counterparts. 
However, following Windsor, the over 1,000 federal statutes that DOMA’s 
limited definitions had a binding effect on are now left undefined and 
 
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Rulings/Downloads/CMS4176R.pdf (instructing the 
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services to look to the state of domicile to determine marital status under 
§§ 416, 426, 426–1 because § 416 explicitly invokes the state of domicile but to look to the state of celebration 
to determine marital status under §§ 1395i–2, 1395p, 1395r to treat “same-sex marriages on the same terms as 
opposite-sex marriages to the greatest extent reasonably possible . . . .”); see also The Supreme Court Ruling 
on the Defense of Marriage Act: What It Means, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/ 
after-doma-summary (last visited Mar. 27, 2015). 
 11 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by Windsor, 113 S. Ct. 2675. DOMA also prevented same-sex couples from 
filing joint tax returns and severely limited same-sex spouses of governmental employees from Social Security 
survivor benefits and prevented the sharing of medical benefits. See 26 U.S.C. § 1(a)–(c); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 402(f)(i). See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Who Decides? The Federal Architecture of DOMA and 
Comparative Marriage Recognition, 41 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 143 (2010) (discussing the federal and state 
architecture of the ramification of DOMA on individual state recognition of same-sex marriage). 
 12 1 U.S.C. § 7. See generally Heather Hamilton, The Defense of Marriage Act: A Critical Analysis of its 
Constitutionally Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 943 (1998) (discussing the 
history of DOMA and its reading under the Full Faith and Credit clause); Sherri L. Toussaint, Defense of 
Marriage Act: Isn’t It Ironic . . . Don’t You Think? A Little Too Ironic, 76 NEB. L. REV 924 (1997) (discussing 
the history of DOMA and its effect on homosexuals). 
 13 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
 14 See generally Bone v. Allen (In re Allen), 186 B.R. 769 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995). 
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susceptible to multiple meanings.15 The ramifications of finding § 3 of DOMA 
unconstitutional are far reaching. Since, under the holding in Windsor, the 
Supreme Court found the definitions of 1 U.S.C. § 7 unconstitutional, any act 
that adopted such definitions as a premise for the provisions of that title now 
must be re-evaluated to determine how married same-sex couples fall into 
those provisions. Due to the unconstitutionality of the federal definitions of 
spouse and marriage under DOMA, this Article asserts that same-sex couples 
should now be permitted to jointly file for bankruptcy under chapters 7 and 13, 
regardless of the state in which the bankruptcy petition is filed. In addition, 
these same-sex couples should be able to use, at the minimum, the allowable 
federal exemptions, as long as the couple is lawfully married in a state that 
recognizes such unions. 
Part I of this Article explains the background of DOMA, its interaction 
with the Code, and the holding of Windsor. Part II.A argues that federalism 
principles and the Tenth Amendment require the Code to read same-sex 
couples into the definitions of marriage and spouse in the Code provisions. Part 
II.B asserts that this reading furthers the goals of 11 U.S.C. § 302(a), the 
section of the Code permitting filing of joint cases. Part II.C argues that same-
sex couples filing jointly must, at a minimum, be able to use the federal 
exemptions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). Part II.D outlines some potential 
ramifications that may result if same-sex couples are able to file jointly under 
the framework proposed. Lastly, Part II.E describes the possible alternatives 
that would allow same-sex couples to file jointly even if this Article’s 
framework is not adopted. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. DOMA and the Bankruptcy Code 
The passage of DOMA represented the federal government’s attempt to 
define and limit the rights of homosexuals on a national scale. Congress passed 
DOMA in response to Baehr v. Lewin, a 1993 case in Hawaii that concerned 
the issuance of same-sex marriage licenses and the effect these licenses would 
have on both federal and state levels.16 
 
 15 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.  
 16 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The Baehr court suggested that marriage licenses that are limited to 
heterosexual couples may discriminate against homosexuals and could be a violation of equal protection. Id. at 
69.  
TOMBACK GALLEYSPROOFS 7/9/2015  12:53 PM 
380 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 31 
Concerned about the potential impact of homosexual couples getting 
married and attempting to get recognition by other states—in addition to the 
issue of federal benefits for homosexual couples—Congress passed DOMA.17 
Congress’s stated purposes in passing DOMA were to: (1) “defend the 
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage;” and (2) “protect the right of 
the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition 
of same-sex unions . . . .”18 
DOMA had two operative sections: (1) choice-of-law provisions; and (2) 
federal definitions provisions.19 The choice-of-law provisions skew the full 
faith and credit requirement by allowing states to deny credit “to any public 
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a 
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under 
the laws. . . .”20 DOMA’s definitions provisions, however, have a much more 
dramatic effect.21 
DOMA, in attempting to accomplish the broad purpose of “defend[ing] the 
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage,” narrowly tailored the 
definitions of spouse and marriage to only include heterosexual couples.22 
DOMA defined marriage as “only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife.”23 Spouse in DOMA is defined as “only 
[married] to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”24 
Examining the legislative history of DOMA, it seems that the motivating factor 
for DOMA’s passage came about as reinforcement of a historical 
 
 17 See generally Susan E. Hauser, More Than Abstract Justice: The Defense of Marriage Act and the 
Equal Treatment of Same-Sex Married Couples Under Section 302(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 85 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 195, 215–16 (2011) (discussing the purpose of Congress passing DOMA). 
 18 H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906. 
 19 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012); 
28 U.S.C. § 1738C); see Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 86 B.U. L. REV. 881, 893–94 (2006). 
 20 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). Traditional full faith and credit requires states to recognize and respect 
each other’s laws. See generally Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Not (Yet?) 
Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors that Determine What the 
Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915 (2006).  
 21 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 113 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). While the choice-of-law 
provision of DOMA is substantial, for the purposes of this Article and the Code, the definitions outlined in 1 
U.S.C. § 7 more definitively affect homosexual couples from jointly filing for bankruptcy under the Code. 
 22 H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906; see 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
 23 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
 24 Id. 
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understanding of marriage and spouse.25 To ensure that these limited 
definitions had a far-reaching and pervasive impact, Congress drafted 1 U.S.C. 
§ 7 so that the definitions of spouse and marriage applied in “determining the 
meaning of any Act of Congress,” making its influence substantial in federal 
law.26 
Bankruptcy law and procedures are defined and outlined in title 11 of the 
United States Code.27 The essence of bankruptcy is “grounded upon the public 
policy of freeing the honest, but unfortunate debtor from the financial burdens 
of prepetition indebtedness and thereby allowing the debtor to make an 
unencumbered fresh start.”28 11 U.S.C. § 101 sets out the definitions for the 
terms used in title 11 and in bankruptcy proceedings.29 The Code does not, in 
11 U.S.C. § 101 or anywhere else, specifically define spouse or marriage as it 
would apply to the Code individually.30 
The Code uses the terms spouse and marriage over sixty times in both 
operative and definitional sections.31 The Code, in 11 U.S.C. § 302(a), outlines 
how joint cases work within the bankruptcy system.32 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) states 
that a joint case is “commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a 
single petition . . . by an individual that may be a debtor . . . and such 
individual’s spouse.”33 The definition of joint case applies to filings under 
chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcies, chapter 13 restructuring bankruptcies, and 
chapter 11 restructuring bankruptcies.34 Section 302 “was designed for ease of 
 
 25 See, e.g., A Bill to Define and Protect the Institution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 27 (1996) (written statement of Lynn D. Wardle, Professor of Law, 
Brigham Young University) (“Section 3 [of DOMA] appears to embody quite accurately the actual historical 
intent and expectation of Congress and federal law generally that when these marriage terms are used in 
federal laws, same-sex couples were not intended to be included.”); 142 Cong. Rec. 16,969 (1996) (statement 
of Rep. Charles Canady) (“But now, it is necessary to make explicit in the federal code Congress’ well-
established and unquestionable intention that ‘marriage’ is limited to unions between one man and one woman. 
Section 3 [of DOMA] changes nothing; it simply reaffirms existing law.”).  
 26 1 U.S.C. § 7.  
 27 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 28 George H. Singer, Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Fundamentals of Nondischargeability in 
Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 325 (1997) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. 
Smith, 807 F.2d 122, 123–24 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 29 11 U.S.C. § 101. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See generally, Jackie Gardina, The Defense of Marriage Act, Same-Sex Relationships and the 
Bankruptcy Code 14–35 (Vt. Law Sch., Paper No. 04-12 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1850926. 
 32 11 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
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administration and to permit the payment of only one filing fee.”35 By allowing 
this consolidation, the bankruptcy system reflected more clearly the reality of 
marital relations as it concerns debt and property ownership.36 Additionally, 
joint cases aid in the efficiency of the court by consolidating the cases to single 
hearings and meetings to save cost and ensure ease.37 
Through the application of 1 U.S.C. § 7 to the Code, only opposite-sex 
couples were permitted to file joint cases.38 Courts reaffirmed this application 
by barring same-sex couples from seeking relief as joint debtors under 11 
U.S.C. § 103(a).39 Interestingly, in 2011, the United States Trustee’s Office, a 
division of the Department of Justice whose sole responsibility is monitoring 
the bankruptcy system, released a statement that the office would no longer 
oppose same-sex couples filing jointly.40 This is significant because it signals 
that the federal office in charge of enforcing the Code no longer finds the joint 
filing of same-sex couples to violate the purpose of the bankruptcy system.41 
 
 35 In re Stuart, 31 B.R. 18, 19 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983); see also In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tex. 1994); In re Birch, 72 B.R. 103 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987); In re Hulk, 8 B.R. 444 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981). 
 36 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5818. 
 37 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 302.02[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 
2010) (“A joint case will facilitate the efficient administration of [the debtors’ estates] and decrease the costs 
associated with administration, thereby benefiting both the debtors and their creditors.”); see also Stuart, 31 
B.R. at 19. 
 38 11 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
 39 See, e.g., In re Wilkerson, No. 05-54096-JDW, 2006 WL 3694638 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2006); 
In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 2004); see generally Hauser, supra note 17 (discussing the 
effect of DOMA on 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) prior to Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Services, 
682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012)). However, there have been cases in which same-sex couples were allowed such 
filings, specifically in California. See, e.g., In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (court denied a motion 
to dismiss filed by the U.S. Trustee on the grounds that DOMA barred a same-sex couple from filing for 
bankruptcy jointly because a dismissal would not serve an important governmental interest). 
 40 See U.S. Shifts Policy on Same-Sex Bankruptcies, REUTERS.COM (July 8, 2011), http://www.reuters. 
com/assets/print?aid=USTRE76770020110708. 
 41 See id. Additionally, other federal government programs and benefits have started recognizing same-
sex marriages, permitting these married same-sex couples access to the same benefits and programs as their 
heterosexual counterparts. These include immigration benefits, veteran/military benefits, and certain tax 
benefits. See Kathleen Michon, Federal Marriage Benefits Available to Same-Sex Couples, NOLO, http:// 
www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/same-sex-couples-federal-marriage-benefits-30326.html (last visited May 
7, 2015). 
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B. Windsor v. United States 
On June 16, 2013, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Windsor,42 
holding that § 3 of DOMA is “unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty 
of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.”43 
Windsor concerned a taxpayer whose same-sex partner had passed away 
and was denied the benefit of spousal deduction because of DOMA.44 Under 
the federal tax law, the benefits of a spousal deduction were limited to spouses 
as defined by 1 U.S.C. § 7, and thus were only available to heterosexual 
couples.45 
In 2007, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were married in a lawful ceremony 
in Ontario, Canada.46 New York law recognized and deemed their Ontario 
marriage to be valid.47 In February 2009, Spyer passed away and left her entire 
estate to Windsor.48 Under DOMA, Windsor and Spyer’s marriage did not 
receive federal recognition and, therefore, Windsor did not qualify for the 
federal estate tax marital exemption.49 Under the exemption, Windsor would 
have been able to exclude from taxation “any interest in property which passes 
or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse . . . .”50 The Internal 
Revenue Service denied the refund on the basis that Windsor was not a 
“surviving spouse” under DOMA’s limited definition.51 Windsor paid the tax 
and then subsequently commenced a refund suit in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York arguing that DOMA violated 
equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.52 
 
 42 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 43 Id. at 2695. 
 44 Id. at 2682. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 2683 (citing Windsor v. United States, 699 F. 3d 169, 177–78 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2012). 
 51 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
 52 Id. While the suit was pending at the District Court, the Attorney General of the United States notified 
the Speaker of the House of Representative that the Department of Justice would not defend the 
constitutionality of § 3 of DOMA. Id. The Attorney General did this through a 28 U.S.C. § 530D letter. In this 
case, it was unusual “because the §530D letter was not preceded by an adverse judgment.” Id. Instead, the 
letter “reflected the Executive’s own conclusion, relying on a definition still being debated and considered in 
the courts, that heightened equal protection scrutiny should apply to laws that classify on the basis of sexual 
orientation.” Id. at 2683–84. In response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of 
Representatives (BLAG) voted to intervene in the pending suit to defend § 3 of DOMA. While the Department 
of Justice did not oppose the limited intervention by BLAG, the District Court denied BLAG’s motion to enter 
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The District Court ruled against the United States, holding that § 3 of 
DOMA is unconstitutional and ordered that the Treasury refund the tax with 
interest to Windsor.53 The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling, 
applying “heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation, as 
both the Department of Justice and Windsor had urged.”54 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of the 
constitutionality of § 3 of DOMA.55 The Court started its discussion with a 
brief history of same-sex marriage in the country, noting that states started 
recognizing these marriages so these same-sex couples could “have the right to 
marry and so live with pride in themselves and their union and in a status of 
equality with all other married persons.”56 
The Court moved on to analyze the “design, purpose, and effect of 
DOMA.”57 The Court stated that “by history and tradition the definition and 
regulation of marriage . . . ha[d] been treated as being within the authority and 
realm of the separate States.”58 However, the Court continued that “Congress, 
in enacting discrete statutes, can make determinations that bear on marital 
rights and privileges” and that “Congress has the power both to ensure 
efficiency in the administration of its programs and to choose what larger goals 
and policies to pursue.”59 
The Court relied on the fact “there is no federal law of domestic 
relations”60 and that “federal courts, as a general rule, do not adjudicate issues 
of marital status even when there might otherwise be a basis for federal 
jurisdiction.”61 Additionally, the Court noted, “for ‘when the Constitution was 
adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband 
and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States.’”62 
 
the suit as of right but did grant intervention by BLAG as an interested party. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 
24(a)(2)). 
 53 Id. at 2684. 
 54 Id. This was the first time heightened scrutiny was used for homosexuals as a class. See Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
 55 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.  
 56 Id. at 2689. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 2689–90. 
 59 Id. at 2690. 
 60 Id. at 2691 (quoting De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956)). 
 61 Id. (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)). 
 62 Id. (quoting Ohio ex. rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383–84 (1930)). 
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Before beginning its analysis, the Court started with its conclusion that 
“DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect. By doing so 
it violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the 
Federal Government.”63 
Once the Court cemented that marriage and domestic relations are within 
the realm of the individual states, the Court attacked DOMA as “reject[ing] the 
long-established precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of 
marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State, though they 
may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next.”64 
Looking to same-sex couples, the Court concluded that “the State’s decision to 
give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and 
status of immense import.”65 After establishing this background, the Court 
framed the question on the constitutionality of DOMA as “whether the 
resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty 
protected by the Fifth Amendment.”66 
The first part of the Court’s analysis concentrated on the two diverging 
purposes between the New York marriage law and DOMA.67 To frame the 
differences, the Court juxtaposed the two against each other: “What the state of 
New York treats as alike federal law deems unlike by a law designed to injure 
the same class the State seeks to protect.”68 
In discussing DOMA, the Court found “DOMA’s unusual deviation from 
the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage” 
highlighted that its “avowed purpose and practical effect . . . are to impose a 
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-
sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”69 With 
this conclusion, the Court held “DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of 
the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution.”70 
 
 63 Id. at 2693 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)). 
 64 Id. at 2692. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 2692–93. 
 68 Id. at 2692. 
 69 Id. at 2693. 
 70 Id. at 2695. 
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While never explicitly saying so, the Court seemed to apply a heightened 
level of scrutiny to find DOMA unconstitutional, closely aligned with the 
intermediate scrutiny test.71 The Court in its opinion, however, did not classify 
same-sex couples as any type of class or identify what level of scrutiny it was 
applying. While the exact scope and impact of Windsor on the classification of 
homosexuals remains unknown, Windsor does make one thing certain—§ 3 of 
DOMA no longer binds federal statutes to the heteronormative definitions of 
marriage and spouse. 
II. FOLLOWING WINDSOR, LAWFULLY MARRIED SAME-SEX COUPLES SHOULD 
BE ALLOWED TO FILE JOINTLY FOR BANKRUPTCY UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 302(A) 
Following the rulings in Windsor, married same-sex couples are now left 
with two questions: (1) whether their marriage will allow them to jointly file 
for bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) and (2) whether they can use the 
federal exemptions outlined in the Code. With the state definition of marriage 
controlling, married same-sex couples fall within the scope of potential joint 
debtors under 11 U.S.C § 302(a) and should be given the same rights and 
privileges as heterosexual couples in bankruptcy. 
A. A State’s Definitions of Spouse and Marriage Are Now Controlling When 
Reading and Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code 
If DOMA no longer applies, where would one look for the definitions of 
marriage and spouse as they apply to the Code? This query raises the 
significant question of whether a same-sex couple that has been recognized in 
 
 71 In analyzing the level of scrutiny applied by the Court in Windsor, it is important to understand the 
traditional levels of constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 2683–84. The lowest form of scrutiny, the rational basis test, 
looks to whether a law is rationally related to a legitimate purpose. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New 
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). If an act does not have a legitimate purpose rationally related to the act, the Court 
would find that the law is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause. See, 
e.g., id. Rational basis is typically applied in cases where there are no fundamental rights or suspect 
classifications at issue. The intermediate scrutiny test looks to whether a law furthers an important government 
interest by means that are substantially related to that interest. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
If an act does not have an important government interest that is substantially related to that interest, then the 
law in question is unconstitutional under Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., id. 
Classically, intermediate scrutiny has been applied by the Court to analyze laws that impact or involve gender 
or other quasi-suspect classes such as children or the socially vulnerable. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Under strict scrutiny, an act is constitutional only if the act furthers a 
compelling governmental interest that is narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest. See, e.g., Korematsu 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 213 (1944). This level of scrutiny has been reserved for laws that impact race or 
fundamental liberties such as marriage, individual autonomy, free speech, and the exercise of religious 
liberties. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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a state can use that state’s definition for the purposes of bankruptcy. Based on 
federalism principles and Tenth Amendment considerations, if a same-sex 
couple is lawfully married in a state that recognizes such a union, then—
regardless of the state in which the same-sex couple files for bankruptcy—the 
bankruptcy court must recognize the marriage for purposes of bankruptcy and 
allow the couple to file jointly.72 
1. Federalism Policy and Choice-of-Law Concerns 
The essential question that is left following Windsor is a choice-of-law 
problem: Which definitions of marriage and spouse now control the Code?73 
Without the Code defining marriage and spouse, the meanings of these words 
remain unresolved until a definitive answer can be given on whether these 
terms now include married same-sex couples.74 
In his pre-Windsor article, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal 
Statutes, William Baude offers a framework in which the states’ definitions of 
marriage and spouse may be adopted by the Code.75 Baude explained that the 
most difficult choice that Congress faces, a choice that is still relevant after 
Windsor, is which state’s law it will adopt for federal purposes.76 Should a 
bankruptcy court look to the law of the state in which the marriage is 
celebrated or the state of the couple’s domicile? If the court looks to the law of 
the state of domicile, should the court look to the couple’s domicile at the time 
of marriage or the domicile at the time of filing?77 Resolution of these issues 
requires speculation about Congress’s intent and the potential for forcing states 
that do not recognize same-sex unions to recognize such marriages.78 
As Baude noted, “[m]arried couples expect that, legal quirks aside, when 
they marry they will remain married unless and until they formally divorce.”79 
 
 72 What may result is a return to a pre-DOMA status in which a same-sex couple married in one state 
should be able to file jointly in any state. See Bone v. Allen (In re Allen), 186 B.R. 769, 773 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 
1995) (suggesting, pre-DOMA, that a same sex couple may be able to file jointly under the Code if their 
marriage is recognized in the state of celebration). 
 73 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (joint filing for spouses). 
 74 Without the controlling definitions of 1 U.S.C. § 7, the Bankruptcy Code lacks an explicit definition 
for marriage and spouse. 
 75 Baude, supra note 6. 
 76 Id. at 1417. 
 77 Id. at 1394–97 (discussing application of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1931), 
and other cases involving conflict of laws between different states in federal courts). 
 78 Id. at 1417. 
 79 Id. 
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The only way to ensure that such a mentality and traditional understanding of 
marriage prevails to both married opposite-sex and same-sex couples is to 
interpret and apply a liberal definition of marriage as used in a state that 
recognizes same-sex marriages.80 Baude argues that all lawful marriages 
should be recognized in any state, regardless of whether that state would be 
willing to issue a marriage license for the couple, advocating for a federal 
choice-of-law rule that would respect all lawful marriages.81 
In the context of bankruptcy, applying this rule to federal provisions in the 
Code would require a bankruptcy court sitting in State A, which does not 
recognize same-sex marriage, to accept the otherwise valid joint petition of a 
same-sex couple lawfully married in State B.82 State A, though, would not be 
compelled to allow the couple access to the benefits or rights that State A only 
allows to opposite-sex couples under its own law.83 This interpretation rule 
would require every bankruptcy court to look to the state of celebration of the 
marriage to recognize lawful marriages, both opposite-sex and same-sex, but 
not necessarily for other applications of state law.84 
Baude explains that this rule should prevail by stating: “Same-sex couples 
may not have the same guarantees with respect to state law, but at least with 
respect to nationwide federal law, they can and should.”85 Furthermore, this 
rule ensures balance between state and federal law because it does not allow 
federal law to be unfairly and disjunctively applied on a state-by-state basis but 
instead allows every citizen to avail themselves of federal processes and 
laws.86 Under any other interpretation, the result would be an unfair 
distribution of federal rights and, in the case of bankruptcy, would lead to a 
geographic barrier to same-sex joint filings. For instance, a same-sex couple 
filing in the state of celebration would be able to avail themselves of the 
federal bankruptcy system but would be barred from filing if they move to a 
state that does not recognize same-sex marriage.87 Such a result is 
fundamentally inequitable. 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 See id. at 1415–17. 
 82 See supra note 10. See generally, In re Matson, 509 B.R. 860 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014). 
 83 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012); see also Baude, supra note 6 at 1416–17. 
 84 Baude, supra note 6 at 1416–17. 
 85 Id. at 1417. 
 86 See id. 
 87 Cf. Gigi Douban, Some Same-Sex Couples Still Struggle at Tax Time, MARKETPLACE (Mar. 16, 2015), 
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/economy/some-same-sex-couples-still-struggle-tax-time (describing the 
difficulty some couples face when they move to a state that does not recognize their marriage). 
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The Code, as it currently stands, does have some inherent geographic 
preferences based on the state in which the debtors file, such as state 
exemptions for those domiciled in that state.88 However, these preferences do 
not affect the bankruptcy process such that they would potentially disallow an 
entire class of people from filing.89 Fixing this variation in state policies into 
the Code, in contrast, forces same-sex couples who wish to file jointly and 
want to utilize federal exemptions to move to a different state so that the 
domicile requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 522 does not apply.90 On a practical level, 
at the very least, this causes upheaval for the personal lives of same-sex 
couples and their families. 
On choice-of-law issues under the Baude framework, a rule that adopts the 
definition of marriage and spouse from the state of celebration would be the 
most legal and equitable as it applies to the Code.91 This would create a 
balance that would allow states to continue to define marriage and spouse 
within their own borders without limiting the definitions given by other 
states.92 In terms of bankruptcy, this means that a marriage celebrated in of one 
of the thirty-seven states that recognize same-sex marriage should be 
recognized under the Code.93 This would result in allowing same-sex couples 
to file jointly under 11 U.S.C. § 302(a).94 
A rule that defines marriage and spouse for the purpose of filing a 
bankruptcy petition does not infringe on the individual rights of the states to 
define marriage within their own borders.95 The states would retain authority to 
manage the issuance of marriage licenses. The federal and state balance would 
remain while allowing same-sex couples the ability to file jointly for 
bankruptcy. 
2. Tenth Amendment and Legislative Interpretation 
The Tenth Amendment offers a framework from which to base the 
assertion that the definitions of marriage and spouse from the state of 
 
 88 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b); Tarvin, Bankruptcy, Relocation, and the Debtor’s Dilemma: Preserving Your 
Homestead Exemption Versus Accepting the New Job Out of State, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 149 (2011). 
 89 See Tarvin, supra note 88 at 149. 
 90 11 U.S.C. § 522; see also infra Part II.C. 
 91 See Baude, supra note 6 at 1418. 
 92 See id. at 1416–17. 
 93 See id. at 1418; see also NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS., supra note 7. 
 94 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (listing requirements for joint filing). 
 95 See Baude, supra note 6 at 1418. 
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celebration should now be read into the Code.96 By doing so, individual states 
would retain control over their own definitions of marriage and spouse for 
purposes of marriage licensing and similar issues. However, they would be 
prevented from barring same-sex couples access to a federal institution, such 
as the bankruptcy system, through those definitions. 
The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the People.”97 It is a well-established principle that 
states have traditionally been given the authority to regulate marriages within 
their own borders.98 The Constitution does not, in any article, grant Congress 
the power to define marriage or any marital rights. There has been some 
argument that Congress, under either the Spending Clause or the Commerce 
Clause, may be able to define marriage and spouse because of the economic 
ramifications that these definitions may have on interstate commerce or federal 
taxation.99 However, these rationales try to shroud moral motivations in an 
economic mask and do not trump the overwhelming precedent and tradition 
that has granted states the right to control the terms of marriages within their 
own borders.100 
Given the substantial amount of case law concerning the longstanding state 
right to define marriage and the lack of case law that has adopted the purported 
economic reasoning for a federal definition of marriage, arguments in favor of 
Congress’s power to define marriage arguably would not survive.101 
Federalism principles seem to dictate that Congress must give deference to the 
 
 96 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (“Insofar as marriage is within temporal 
control, the States lay on the guiding hand. ‘The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, 
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.’” (quoting In re 
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890))); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (“[T]he State does 
not contend in its argument before this Court that its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited 
notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could it do so . . . .”); Massachusetts v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11–13 (1st Cir. 2012) (reasoning that, while DOMA did 
not violate the Tenth Amendment, it violated the Equal Protection Clause after infringement on an area of law 
traditionally governed by states). 
 99 See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson, A Commerce Clause Standard for the New Millennium: “Yes” to Broad 
Congressional Control Over Commercial Transactions; “No” to Federal Legislation on Social and Cultural 
Issues, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1213, 1241 (2003). 
 100 Id. 
 101 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35 (1878) (“The State . . . has absolute right to prescribe 
the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for 
which it may be dissolved.”). 
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states when defining marriage and spouse.102 The Tenth Amendment reinforces 
this premise.103 It follows that any federal statute that uses terms that are 
defined by the states should be interpreted to allow all citizens equal access to 
federal statutory schemes and rights.104 
Legislative interpretation techniques further support the argument that the 
definitions of marriage and spouse in the Code should respect state definitions 
of marriage and spouse.105  Typically, in order for Congress to impede on a 
traditionally held state right, a clear statement is required.106 This clear 
statement requirement arises from the substantive federalism canon of 
legislative interpretation.107 The purpose of the federalism canon is to protect 
state sovereignty and autonomy.108 
DOMA arguably acted as Congress’s clear statement that it wished to 
supplant, in some respects, the state’s traditionally exclusive power governing 
marriage and to apply a federal definition to federal programs.109 However, 
Windsor invalidated Congress’s preemption of the use of state definitions on 
the federal level by finding § 3 of DOMA unconstitutional.110 With this 
invalidation of § 3, the federal government may no longer use its own 
definitions of marriage and spouse in the Code and other affected statutes.111 
Without this federal directive in place, the choice-of-law analysis requires that 
the states’ definitions of marriage and spouse govern.112 
The spirit of the Tenth Amendment leads us to the conclusion that states 
should have dominion over the issuance and control of marriage within their 
 
 102 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 103 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. But see Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 11–13 (“In our view, neither the Tenth 
Amendment nor the Spending Clause invalidates DOMA . . . .”). 
 104 See infra Part II.C.1. 
 105 See generally Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare 
Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791 
(2010) (discussing the canons of construction). 
 106 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461, 464, 467 (1991) (refusing to broaden federal powers to 
impede on traditional state powers without clear statement from Congress). 
 107 See id. 
 108 See Slocum, supra note 105, at 813 (“[S]everal federalism canons are based on the assumption that 
Congress is concerned with federalism issues and desires to preserve local authority.”). 
 109 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); H.R. REP. 
No. 104-664, at 1–18 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906 (describing the history behind the 
perceived need for DOMA and the governmental interests offered to support its passage). 
 110 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695; cf. Baude, supra note 6, at 1415–18 (discussing and suggesting a system 
of choice-of-law concerning DOMA). 
 111 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695. 
 112 See supra Part II.A.1. 
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own borders. However, this dominion does not grant an individual state the 
authority to block its citizens from access to a federal process. To respect the 
states’ authority to regulate marriage while protecting citizens’ access to 
bankruptcy, the Code should be interpreted to adopt the same definitions of 
marriage and spouse of the state of celebration, not the state of domicile. This 
interpretation would permit same-sex couples to file for joint bankruptcies 
under 11 U.S.C. § 302(a), regardless of the state in which the same-sex couple 
files. 
B. Allowing Same-Sex Couples to Jointly File Furthers the Goals of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 302(a) by Easing the Bankruptcy Process 
When enacting § 302(a), Congress noted that, due to the fact that married 
couples tend to have joint debts and joint property, the bankruptcy system 
should reflect that reality by allowing married couples to file jointly.113 The 
Senate Judiciary Committee explained, “A joint case will facilitate 
consolidation of their estates, to the benefit of both the debtors and the 
creditors, because the cost of administration will be only one filing fee.”114 The 
purpose of § 302(a), read along with the purpose of the overall bankruptcy 
system to “provide a fresh start for the honest debtor” and “to protect the rights 
of creditors by creating an organized system that governs the repayment of 
debts,”115 would be furthered by allowing same-sex couples to file jointly. 
Courts have construed literally the marriage requirement of § 302(a), thus 
limiting joint filings to couples that are lawfully married.116 With this limited 
reading, the bankruptcy courts would have to recognize same-sex couples as 
married under the language of the Code.117 
Under the framework proposed in this Article, the purpose of § 302(a) 
would further be satisfied because it would allow lawfully married same-sex 
 
 113 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5818; supra text 
accompanying notes 31–37. 
 114 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5818. 
 115 Jill C. Rush, Unequal Treatment and Creditor Frustrations: The Limited Impact of Legalizing Same 
Sex Marriage, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 743, 745–46 (2005). 
 116 See Hauser, supra note 17 at 200–12 (describing the history of § 302(a) and how courts would not 
allow “unmarried debtors who live together,” “an adult child,” and “a corporation and its sole shareholder” to 
file jointly under § 302(a)) (citing In re Lucero, 408 B.R. 348 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009); In re Jephunneh 
Lawrence & Assocs. Chartered, 63 B.R. 318 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1986); In re Malone, 50 B.R. 2 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 1985); In re Jackson, 28 B.R. 559 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Coles, 14 B.R. 5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1981)). 
 117 See id. 
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couples who have incurred joint debt to consolidate their bankruptcies for the 
sake of efficiency.118 By allowing same-sex couples to file jointly, creditors 
would now have access to a larger estate to satisfy their claims.119 
Furthermore, a smaller administrative fee would be incurred in a joint filing, 
preserving some, albeit marginal, wealth for the bankruptcy estate.120 Since an 
overarching purpose of bankruptcy is to protect creditors’ rights to repayment 
of debts, by interpreting the Code to allow married same-sex couples to file 
jointly under §  302(a), creditors would now have a far better chance of getting 
a higher rate of return on their debt than if same-sex couples had to file 
separately and the spouses were not jointly liable for the debt.121 
C. Same-Sex Couples Filing Jointly Can Avail Themselves of Either Federal 
or State Exemptions 
With the adoption of the above interpretative framework, which would 
allow same-sex couples that are lawfully married to file jointly, the issue now 
becomes which exemptions the jointly-filing couple may use.122 First, under 
federalism principles, the same-sex couple should be able to, at a minimum, 
use the federal exemptions outlined in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) even if an individual 
state, under its police power, chooses to provide access to those exemptions 
only to heterosexual couples.123 Second, the Code should be amended to 
guarantee availability of each state’s exemptions to all lawfully married 
couples even if such state does not recognize the marriage under its law. 
1. Under Federalism Principles, Jointly Filing Same-Sex Couples Should 
Be Able to Avail Themselves of at Least the Federal Exemptions of 11 
U.S.C. § 522(d) 
Jointly filing same-sex couples permitted to apply the exemptions of a state 
that recognizes their marriage would be able to apply either federal 
exemptions—if that state permits—or the state’s exemptions.124 However, 
under the federalism framework offered by this Article, a state that does not 
 
 118 11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
 119 See id. § 541. 
 120 See In re Stuart, 31 B.R. 18, 19 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983); see also In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436 (Bankr. 
W.D. Tex. 1994); In re Birch, 72 B.R. 103 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987); In re Hulk, 8 B.R. 444 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
1981). 
 121 See 11 U.S.C. § 302. 
 122 See id. § 522. 
 123 See id. § 522(d). 
 124 See id. 
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recognize same-sex marriage should not have to allow same-sex couples filing 
jointly in that state to take advantage of its bankruptcy exemptions.125 
Under the Code, a state is authorized to “opt-out” of the federal exemptions 
and require that its citizens use that state’s individual exemptions.126 Staying 
true with the federalism argument, states remain sovereign over the marital 
systems within their borders, which means that they do not have to allow 
same-sex couples to use their exemptions.127 For example, an individual state 
may limit its own exemptions to only heterosexual married couples. So if a 
state does not recognize same-sex marriages within its borders that state would 
not have to offer to a jointly filing couple the exemptions that are offered to a 
heterosexual couple.128 This distinction would create an additional burden for 
same-sex couples by limiting their ability to file jointly because, without 
access to any exemptions, the entire estate would be vulnerable to creditors. 
However, the state would not be able to completely bar same-sex couples from 
filing individually and then applying the state’s exemptions as individual filers. 
While a state’s ability to limit access to its exemptions may seem counter to 
the federalism analysis, it in fact further reinforces the separation of state and 
federal powers and the need for equal access of all citizens to federal laws and 
protections.129 The Code applies to all citizens regardless of residency.130 
Exemptions, however, may be either from the federal code itself or 
supplemented or substituted by the laws of individual states.131 If a state 
chooses to have its own exemptions for bankruptcies, then the state has the 
authority to apply them under the definitions it has set.132 So, if State A’s 
exemption is limited to a “married couple,” and State A does not recognize 
same-sex marriages, then, if federalism is the exclusive concern, a jointly filing 
lawfully married same-sex couple ought not be able use the exemption. 
However, state exemptions should be read to allow jointly filing same-sex 
couples to use the federal exemptions listed in 11 U.S.C. § 522 if a state does 
 
 125 See id. § 522(b). 
 126 See id.; Tarvin, supra note 88, at 149. 
 127 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 12 
(1st Cir. 2012). 
 128 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). 
 129 See supra Part II.A. 
 130 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 131 Id. § 522(b). 
 132 See id. 
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not recognize their marriage for state law exemptions.133 If the state is an opt-
out state that only allows its own exemptions to apply and does not recognize 
same-sex marriages, it must allow same-sex couples that are lawfully married 
in other states to use the federal exemptions. For the same reasons that the 
Code should be read to include same-sex couples, states should not, under the 
guise of federalism, be able to limit same-sex couples’ access to the federal 
exemptions that are available to all citizens. 
This suggested framework concerning state exemptions versus federal 
exemptions satisfies state sovereignty because it does not require the state to 
change its own policy to accommodate the decisions of a sister state. It 
satisfies federalism principles because it gives all U.S. citizens equal access to 
exemptions, either through state exemptions or, if excluded from state 
exemptions, federal exemptions. This balance resembles the legal 
constructions that require the Code terms marriage and spouse be read 
according to a state that recognizes same-sex marriage because it focuses on 
the need for a balance between state and federal power. 
2. Amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 522 
To ensure that this proposed framework does not create a power shift where 
states would be able to unjustly prohibit same-sex couples filing jointly from 
using both state exemptions and federal exemptions, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) should 
be amended.134 Such an amendment could either create a carve out giving 
same-sex couples access to the federal exemptions if a state limits access to its 
exemptions only to heterosexual couples or restructure the exemptions in the 
Code to a federal floor system in which states can then supplement by 
authorizing more exemptions than federally mandated.135 
Section 522 of the Code sets forth the various exemptions a debtor may 
take in his or her petition.136 Section 522(b) represents a compromise between 
the Senate and the House concerning whether federal exemptions or state 
 
 133 See generally id. § 522. Interestingly, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) discusses the inability of joint filers to 
each choose different exemptions on their petition. This restriction is of note because the Code, when 
discussing an involuntary filing of a spouse, defines marriage as a “husband and wife.” Id. A strict textual 
reading of the section arguably limits the scope of the “husband and wife” phrase to cases involuntarily filed 
under 11 U.S.C. § 303. 
 134 Where debtors are domiciled in a state that does not recognize their marriage, when applying certain 
provisions of the Code, a bankruptcy court may be constrained by that state’s definitions of marriage. See 
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). 
 135 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). 
 136 Id. § 522. 
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exemptions should be controlling on a debtor’s petition.137 Essentially, 11 
U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)138 gives the debtor two options: 1) the debtor may use the 
federal exemptions outlined in § 522(d); or 2) the debtor may use the 
exemptions of the applicable state law.139 However, these options can be 
limited if the state in which the debtor files has opted out of the federal 
exemptions.140 
The language of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) gives states the option to opt-out of 
the federal exemptions of § 522(d), which limits a debtor filing in that state to 
the exemptions of that state alone.141 The relevant language in § 522(b)(2) 
states: “[P]roperty listed in this paragraph is property that is specified under 
subsection (d), unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under 
paragraph (3)(A) specifically does not so authorize.”142 For a state to opt out 
of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), a state would need to pass a statute to bar citizens from 
using the federal exemptions.143 To date, thirty-four states have enacted 
legislation that has limited debtors to the state exemptions.144 
For a debtor to use these state exemptions, the Code has a domicile 
prerequisite that requires that the debtor file in 
 
 137 James B. Haines, Jr., Section 522’s Opt-Out Clause: Debtors’ Bankruptcy Exemptions in a Sorry State, 
1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 6 n.26 (1983). 
 138 Section 522(b)(1) states: 
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the 
estate the property listed in either paragraph (2) or, in the alternative, paragraph (3) of this 
subsection. In joint cases filed under section 302 of this title and individual cases filed under 
section 301 or 303 of this title by or against debtors who are husband and wife, and whose estates 
are ordered to be jointly administered under Rule 1015(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure, one debtor may not elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (2) and the other 
debtor elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (3) of this subsection. If the parties cannot 
agree on the alternative to be elected, they shall be deemed to elect paragraph (2), where such 
election is permitted under the law of the jurisdiction where the case is filed. 
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). 
 139 Id. § 522(b)(1), (d). 
 140 Id. § 522(b)(1). 
 141 Richard E. Mendales, Rethinking Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 40 B.C. L. REV. 851, 859 (1999). 
 142 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 143 Haines, supra note 137, at 8. 
 144 Id. at 4 & n.13. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See, e.g., NY DEBT. & 
CRED. LAW § 284 (Consol. 2014) (“In accordance with the provisions of section five hundred twenty-two (b) 
of title eleven of the United States Code, debtors domiciled in this state are not authorized to exempt from the 
estate property that is specified under subsection (d) of such section.”) (example of an opt-out statute). 
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the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been located for the 730 
days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition or if 
the debtor’s domicile has not been located in a single State for such 
730-day period, the place in which the debtor’s domicile was located 
for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day or for longer portion 
of such 180-day period than in any other place.145 
If the debtor qualifies as being domiciled in a state under § 522(b)(3)(A), 
and that state has an opt-out statute, then that debtor is limited to that state’s 
exemptions.146 If the debtor is unable to meet the domicile requirement of 
§ 522(b)(3)(A), the debtor may use the exemptions in § 522(d).147 Thus, 
debtors who are unable to claim a residency under any of the domicile 
requirements of § 522(b)(3)(A) default into the exemptions of § 522(d), 
regardless of whether the state in which the debtors currently reside has an opt-
out statute.148 Cases, both prior to and after the enactment of Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Prevention Act, have found that “federal 
exemptions [are] available under the exemption saving sentence where a 
debtor is not residing in the state under whose law the debtor’s exemptions are 
determined, even when those states have opted out of the federal 
exemptions.”149 
Under the proposed federalism framework allowing lawfully married same-
sex couples to file jointly for bankruptcy in any state, § 522 would need to be 
amended to ensure that same-sex couples can avail themselves of the federal 
exemptions.150 To ensure that a state does not try to circumvent the application 
of the allowance of same-sex couples from jointly filing for bankruptcy under 
the proposed interpretation of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522 should have language 
that would reframe the opt-out powers of the states to limit them so as to not 
 
 145 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). 
 146 Id. § 522(b)(1). 
 147 Id. § 522(b)(3) (“If the effect of the domiciliary requirement under subparagraph (A) is to render the 
debtor ineligible for any exemption, the debtor may elect to exempt property that is specified under subsection 
(d).”). 
 148 See, e.g., In re Underwood, 342 B.R. 358, 362 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2006). 
 149 In re Fabert, No. 06-21539, 2008 WL 104104, at *1, *20 (D. Kan. Jan. 9, 2008); see also In re 
Chandler, 362 B.R. 723, 726–27 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2007); In re Battle, 366 B.R. 635, 637 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tex. 2006) (“[T]he Court holds that a non-Florida-resident debtor, forced into using Florida exemption law by 
section 522(b)(3)(A), may elect to use the federal exemptions under section 522(b)(2), because Florida’s opt-
out law does not bar non-residents from claiming federal exemptions.”); In re Schulz, 101 B.R. 301, 302 
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) (finding that, pre-BAPCPA, the non-resident was not bound by an opt-out state’s 
statute and was allowed to use the federal exemptions). 
 150 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). 
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bar same-sex couples from both state and federal exemptions when filing 
jointly.151 
As discussed above,152 § 522 needs an interpretation that would permit a 
state to retain its authority to legislate its own exemptions while ensuring that 
same-sex couples are still able to use the federal bankruptcy system.153 Under 
this interpretation, in order to ensure that a state can retain its police power in 
controlling the exemptions available to its residents, § 522(b) should add a 
subparagraph that would carve out an exception to the opt-out authority for the 
state that would still allow same-sex couples to use § 522(d) exemptions.154 
As it stands now, § 522(b) enables a state to prevent all of its citizens from 
accessing the federal exemptions of § 522(d).155 This blanket limitation would 
allow the state to limit jointly filing same-sex couples from any spouse 
exemptions that would be available to similarly situated heterosexual 
couples.156 Without an amendment to § 522, a state would be able to make a 
DOMA-like barricade on same-sex couples wishing to file jointly by severely 
limiting their options for exemptions.157 
To place a safeguard so that states do not attempt to use this apparent 
loophole to limit and deter same-sex couples from filing within its border, 
Congress should add a paragraph at the end of § 522(b). This paragraph would 
exempt jointly filing same-sex couples from having solely to use an opt-out 
state’s exemptions if the state’s joint exemptions apply only to heterosexual 
couples. A state is well within its police powers to determine those exemptions 
and limitations within its borders, but those powers should not have the ability 
to unfairly limit the access of same-sex couples to the bankruptcy system.158 A 
proposed amendment that would create the balance between state sovereignty 
and equal access to exemptions for same-sex couples would be: 
If the effect of paragraph (3) is to render jointly filing debtors 
ineligible for certain exceptions or limits their access to certain 
exceptions due to state or local law concerning sexual orientation, the 
state exemption is to be read as including lawfully married same-sex 
 
 151 See generally id. § 522(b). 
 152 See supra Part II.C.1. 
 153 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). 
 154 See id. § 522(b), (d). 
 155 Id. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See id. 
 158 See supra Part II.C.1. 
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couples. A state or local law limits or renders jointly filing debtors 
ineligible from certain exemptions if the state or local law actually or 
constructively bars same-sex couples from applying state or local 
exemptions based solely or in part on the debtors’ sexual orientation. 
This proposed amendment would allow the state to remain in control of its own 
exemptions under the opt-out powers of § 522(b), but would impair it from 
using that power to limit the access to married same-sex couples.159 
Alternatively, some commentators have proposed getting rid of the opt-out 
system of § 522 and instead enacting a federal floor that states would then have 
the option of supplementing.160 James B. Haines, Jr., in his piece Section 522’s 
Opt-Out Clause: Debtors’ Bankruptcy Exemptions in a Sorry State, argues that 
enacting a federal floor provision instead of an opt-out ability would enable 
Congress to “enact a federal provision effecting federal fresh start 
objectives.”161 This provision would not only reinforce the federalism equal 
access framework where a minimum standard is available to all citizens, but 
would also streamline the exemptions available to debtors.162 
However, this system would have a more limiting effect on the ability for 
states to police their social policies by not allowing them to have complete 
control over their own exemptions. While states would be able to alter the 
exemptions to supplement the federal floor, the states would be unable to have 
complete control over the access to these exemptions. Compared to the 
suggestion of amending § 522 to add a carve out of the opt-out option, the 
federal floor gives a universal base that all states would have to follow.163 This 
floor would ease the bankruptcy process because it would place every debtor at 
the same starting point concerning exemptions. In contrast, the current opt-out 
system is inherently confusing due to exemptions that vary by state.164 
It is worth noting that while § 522(b) does cite to Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 1015(b) as one of the possible conflicts that may 
 
 159 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). 
 160 Haines, supra note 137, at 41; see H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., § 522(b) (1977). See generally W. Homer 
Drake, Jr., The Judges’ Bankruptcy Bill and the Commission’s Bill: A Question of Access to the Judicial 
Process, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1009, 1027–28 (1975); Joe Lee, A Critical Comparison of the Commission Bill 
and the Judges’ Bill for the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 22–24 (1975) 
(discussing the difference between the Commission’s Bill and Judges’ Bill with respect to their treatment of 
state exemptions vis-à-vis federal exemptions). 
 161 Haines, supra note 137, at 41–42.  
 162 See id. at 41. 
 163 See Haines, supra note 137, at 41; supra Part II.C.1. 
 164 See Haines, supra note 137, at 41. 
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arise when determining whether state or federal exemptions apply to joint 
filing spouses, the fact that it is limited to “husband and wife” debtors does not 
adversely affect the options in amending or changing § 522(b).165 This 
provision is narrowly tailored for the cases that are an involuntary 
consolidation of individual cases of a husband and wife.166 It would be 
preferable for Rule 1015 and § 522(b) of the Code to be amended to change the 
language from “husband and wife” to “spouses,” but, under the interpretation 
of this Article, it does not create an issue with which exemptions would 
apply.167 
Either of these options—(1) amending § 522(b) with the carve out or, (2) 
replacing the opt-out provision with a federal floor—would ensure that under 
the post-Windsor interpretation of the Code, all citizens would have fair and 
equal access to the bankruptcy process.168 The revision of § 522(b) to have a 
federal floor would better serve the Code and federalism principles, though, 
because it integrates into the Code the minimum that each state must offer, 
 
 165 Section § 522(b)(1) states: 
In joint cases filed . . . against debtors who are husband and wife, and whose estates are ordered 
to be jointly administered under Rule 1015(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, one 
debtor may not elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (2) and the other debtor elect to 
exempt property listed in paragraph (3) of this subsection. If the parties cannot agree on the 
alternative to be elected, they shall be deemed to elect paragraph (2), where such election is 
permitted under the law of the jurisdiction where the case is filed. 
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2012). FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b) states: 
If a joint petition or two or more petitions are pending in the same court by or against (1) a 
husband and wife, or (2) a partnership and one or more of its general partners, or (3) two or more 
general partners, or (4) a debtor and an affiliate, the court may order a joint administration of the 
estates. . . . An order directing joint administration of individual cases of a husband and wife 
shall, if one spouse has elected the exemptions under § 522(b)(2) of the Code and the other has 
elected the exemptions under § 522(b)(3), fix a reasonable time within which either may amend 
the election so that both shall have elected the same exemptions. The order shall notify the 
debtors that unless they elect the same exemptions within the time fixed by the court, they will be 
deemed to have elected the exemptions provided by § 522(b)(2). 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b). 
 166 See 11 U.S.C. § 303. 
 167 Id. § 522(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015. 
 168 A third approach would be to have a same-sex married couple move their residency if they are 
currently located in an opt-out state in order to make the couple fail the domicile requirement of 
§ 522(b)(3)(A) and default into the federal exemptions. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). This approach would 
allow the debtors to get around the limiting provision of § 522(b)(2), which bars debtors from using the federal 
exemptions, by making the same-sex debtors not domiciled under the Code. See id. § 522(b). By not being 
domiciled to any particular state, only the federal exemptions of § 522(d) would apply to the same-sex couple 
jointly filing, and same-sex couples in bankruptcy would avoid unfair treatment from the exemptions of an 
opt-out state. See id. § 522(b)(3)(A). 
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including allowing jointly filing same-sex couples to use exemptions, while 
still giving the states the ability to supplement the exemptions based on that 
state’s individual prerogatives.169 Additionally, if Congress were to amend 
§ 522 to have a federal floor, it would create a smoother understanding of 
exemptions across state borders instead of the current disjunctive nature of 
states having the option to implement their own individual exemptions.170 
D. Ramifications of Same-Sex Joint Filings 
Under the post-Windsor interpretation of the Code discussed above, same-
sex couples now have the ability to file joint bankruptcies with the exact same 
rights and powers as jointly filing heterosexual couples.171 Nevertheless, this 
does present new issues for same-sex couples wanting to file jointly. Now that 
same-sex couples would have the same posture as heterosexual couples, they 
would be subject to the same limitations that the Code places on married 
couples. 
Under the DOMA definitions, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) did not apply to same-
sex couples, and an individual who was in a same-sex marriage but was filing 
for a chapter 13 bankruptcy individually was not required to disclose the 
income of his or her spouse because the Code and 1 U.S.C. § 7 did not 
recognize same-sex spouses.172 Now, though, under the scheme proposed 
above, the debtor would need to disclose the same-sex spouse’s income, 
regardless of whether they were filing jointly. This may result in the filing 
spouse becoming an above-median debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(1), 
triggering the five-year plan requirement.173 Additionally, this may result in a 
higher projected disposable income, which would lead to higher monthly 
payments under the plan.174 
Debt limitations may also become problematic for same-sex couples now 
wanting to file jointly under chapter 13 of the Code. Under 11 U.S.C. § 109(e): 
an individual with regular income and such individual’s spouse, 
except a stockbroker or a commodity broker, that owe, on the date of 
the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts 
 
 169 See Haines, supra note 137, at 41. 
 170 See id. 
 171 See supra Parts II.A–C. 
 172 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (“If the current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse 
combined . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 173 Id. § 1322(d)(1). 
 174 Id. § 1325(b)(2) (defining disposable income). 
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that aggregate less than $383,175 and noncontingent, liquidated, 
secured debts of less than $1,149,525 may be a debtor under chapter 
13 of this title.175 
The aggregation limitation of § 109(e) may now prove troublesome for same-
sex couples who want to file jointly because they may not qualify for a chapter 
13 when the couple’s debts are aggregated together. Prior to the option to 
jointly file, same-sex couples did not necessarily have to worry about the 
aggregate collection of their debts because they were limited to filing 
individually. Under the framework proposed in this Article however, if a same-
sex couple wishes to file jointly under chapter 13, their aggregated debt may 
not allow them to utilize the personal restructuring of chapter 13. If a same-sex 
couple chooses to file jointly with an aggregate amount of debt that exceeds 
either or both the secured or unsecured debt limitations of § 109(e), the couple 
may only have the option of voluntarily dismissing the case and filing 
individually or completely liquidating under a joint chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, the recognition of same-sex marriage under the Code could 
have ramifications on both chapter 7 and chapter 13 liabilities because the 
assets of the marital unit may become larger. Sections like 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(a)(4), which requires debtors to estimate the value of a liquidated estate 
under chapter 7 in order for a chapter 13 plan to be confirmed, may 
substantially increase the confirmation threshold because the Code would now 
require the debtor to consider their same-sex spouse.176 Ultimately, this may 
actually exclude some same-sex couples from the bankruptcy system due to 
high payments or over-exempt assets when, under DOMA, they would not 
have been limited in such ways. 
With same-sex couples being able to file jointly under this proposed 
framework, the property of the estate also changes form. 11 U.S.C. § 541 
defines property of the estate for bankruptcy proceedings.177 Section 541(a) 
defines property of the bankruptcy estate as, “all legal or equitable interests of 
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,” “all interests of 
the debtor and the debtor’s spouse in community property as of the 
 
 175 Id. § 109(e).  
 176 Id. § 1325(a)(4). See generally Robert F. Kidd & Frederick C. Hertz, Partnered in Debt: The Impacts 
of California’s New Registered Domestic Partner Law on Creditors’ Remedies and Debtors’ Rights, Under 
California Law and Under Federal Bankruptcy Law, 28 FED. CAL. BANKR. J. 148 (2006) (discussing the 
ramifications of the California law which has analogous ties to the arguments set out in the article but just on a 
state level scale). 
 177 11 U.S.C. § 541. 
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commencement of the case,” and “[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or 
profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are earning from 
services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the 
case.”178 Under this framework, which allows married same-sex couples to 
jointly file, the property of the estate will increase to include any property that 
the same-sex couple jointly owns because of § 541(a)(2).179 Property of the 
estate includes: 
[a]ll interests of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse in community 
property as of the commencement of the case that is under the sole, 
equal, or joint management and control of the debtor; or liable for an 
allowable claim against the debtor, or for both an allowable claim 
against the debtor and allowable claim against the debtor’s spouse, to 
the extent that such interest is so liable.180 
Thus, the allowance of same-sex couples to be recognized as married under the 
Code affects the scope of the bankruptcy estate, even if the same-sex couple 
does not file jointly.181 
Those states that have community property laws for married couples will 
now be faced with an interesting change in policy under the proposed 
framework of the Code.182 In particular, California’s community property law 
offers an excellent example of how the recognition of same-sex marriages in 
the Code can substantially alter the estate under § 541(a). Robert Kidd and 
Frederick Hertz explored these issues.183 Kidd and Hertz asserted that, while 
same-sex domestic partners under California law may have community 
property that “significantly expands creditors’ rights in the assets of registered 
domestic partners,” under DOMA, the Code did not afford such rights to 
creditors.184 However, under the framework suggested in this Article, the 
community property would then be available to creditors under the Code as 
long as the couple is both registered as domestic partners in California and 
lawfully married in a state that allows same-sex unions.185 So, under 
California’s community property laws and the framework of this Article, a 
 
 178 Id. § 541(a). 
 179 Id. § 541(a)(2). 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 See Kidd & Hertz, supra note 176, at 148–53. 
 183 Id. at 148. 
 184 Id. at 157. 
 185 See Kidd & Hertz, supra note 176, at 155–58; supra Part II.A. 
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married same-sex couple that files, either jointly or individually, will have their 
estate expanded under the new reading of § 542(a).186 
With this ability to file joint petitions under the Code, other limitations 
arise with the expanded definitions of marriage and spouse. For same-sex 
couples to be truly equal to their heterosexual couple counterparts, they also 
must face the same limitations of the Code. 
E. Alternatives to State Recognition of Same-Sex Couples Joint Filing Under 
11 U.S.C. § 302(a) 
If the above framework is rejected, there still may be the possibility for 
same-sex couples wishing to file jointly to access the bankruptcy system. In 
states such as California and New York where same-sex couples can lawfully 
marry, the bankruptcy courts in those jurisdictions have allowed same-sex 
couples to file jointly.187 Courts finding that same-sex couples could file 
jointly,188 even with DOMA’s limiting definitions of marriage and spouse 
controlling the reading of 11 U.S.C. § 302(a), justified their decisions on the 
bankruptcy court’s equitable powers, specifically concerning the overarching 
purposes of the bankruptcy system.189 With the bankruptcy court’s power 
originating from equity, the courts have the ability to weigh the equitable 
considerations of a fresh start for debtors against the necessary protections of 
creditors to circumvent certain barriers that would bar a joint filing.190 
An example of this use of equitable powers is in the case of In re Somers 
where the court found that the United States Trustee’s motion to dismiss under 
§ 707(a)191 because of DOMA required dismissal was not “in the best interests 
 
 186 Kidd & Hertz, supra note 176, at 186. 
 187 See, e.g., In re Ziviello-Howell, No. 2:11CV00916, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57838 (E.D. Cal. May 31, 
2011); In re Somers, 448 B.R. 677, 682–83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); Hauser, supra note 17, at 196. 
 188 See, e.g., Ziviello-Howell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57838; Somers, 448 B.R. at 682–83.  
 189 See Rush, supra note 115, at 745–46 (discussing the purposes of the bankruptcy system: “to provide a 
fresh start for the honest debtor” and “to protect the rights of creditors by creating an organized system that 
governs the repayment of debts”). 
 190 See id. 
 191 11 U.S.C. § 707 (2012). Section 707(a) states:  
(a) The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a hearing and only for 
cause, including— 
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors; 
(2) nonpayment of any fees of charges required under chapter 123 of title 28; and 
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or such additional time 
as the court may allow after the filing of the petition commencing such case, the information 
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of all parties” and thus allowed the case to continue as a joint filing.192 The 
court reasoned that since failure to abide by DOMA did not fall under any of 
the provisions of § 707(a) that would permit dismissal, the Trustee’s motion 
was improper.193 The court continued and explained that when determining 
whether a § 707(a) motion for dismissal should be granted, the court “has 
substantial discretion in ruling on a motion to dismiss under section 707(a), 
and in exercising that discretion [it] must consider any extenuating 
circumstances, as well as the interests of the various parties.”194 Particularly, 
the court noted that when a § 707(a) motion is “not premised upon one of the 
enumerated reasons” the court must give a “case-by-case analysis to determine 
‘whether dismissal would be in the best interest of all parties . . . .’”195 If the 
above framework were not adopted, moving forward, bankruptcy courts may 
be able to frame the allowance of the same-sex joint filing as an equitable 
remedy for the “best interests of all parties.”196 
Along this same line of reasoning, a bankruptcy court may find that under 
11 U.S.C. § 105(a), the court could allow the joint filing of a bankruptcy for a 
same-sex couple.197 11 U.S.C. § 105 describes the powers of the court in 
bankruptcy proceedings.198 In relevant part, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) states: “The 
court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”199 If courts were to adopt 
the premise that one of the “provisions of this title”200 is to administer a 
bankruptcy proceeding in “the best interests of all parties,”201 then the court 
may have substantial leeway in allowing same-sex couples to file jointly if 
doing so would be “appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”202 
Then, much like the court in Somers, the circumstances surrounding joint 
cases filed by same-sex couples may be positioned in such a way that it would 
 
required by paragraph (1) of section 521(a), but only on a motion by the United States 
trustee. 
Id. at § 707(a). 
 192 448 B.R. at 683. 
 193 Id. at 682–83. 
 194 Id. at 682 (quoting 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 707). 
 195 Id. at 682–83 (quoting In re Dinova, 212 B.R. 437, 442 (2d Cir. B.A.P. 1997)). 
 196 Id. at 683. 
 197 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012). 
 198 Id. § 105(a). 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Somers, 448 B.R. at 683. 
 202 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). 
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be to the benefit of both the creditors and the debtors to allow the joint case to 
proceed. This is because, as discussed earlier, allowing same-sex couples to 
file jointly would most likely increase the assets available in the bankruptcy 
estate.203 With this increase in estate property, the creditors, theoretically, 
would be able to receive a greater return on their claims from the joint debtors’ 
estate than if they were to receive distributions from an individual’s estate. In 
this formulation of court authority, it would be within the bankruptcy court’s 
power to allow same-sex couples to file jointly if it were to the best interests to 
all the parties. 
While the Supreme Court has found DOMA’s definitional section 
unconstitutional, the bankruptcy court has alternatives to ensure fair and 
equitable administration of a same-sex couple’s estate if all states are not 
required to allow same-sex couples to file jointly under the framework argued 
for in this Article. 
CONCLUSION 
Following Windsor, same-sex couples who are lawfully married in a state 
that recognizes such unions can now file joint bankruptcies in any state and 
apply either federal exemptions or allowable state exemptions because of the 
unconstitutionality of DOMA and its definitions of “spouse” and “marriage.” 
The definitions of “spouse” and “marriage” in the Code should be read to 
respect marriages lawfully performed in the state of celebration in light of 
traditional federalism principles, which have left the definitions of marital 
rights to the state. All citizens should have equal access to the Code no matter 
what state of origin or sexual orientation. With multiple states now recognizing 
same-sex marriages, the Code must also recognize these marriages in order to 
truly be available to all citizens. 
The writing is on the wall. Marriage may soon be recognized as a 
fundamental right for all citizens—homosexual and heterosexual alike. The 
Supreme Court heard Obergefell v. Hodges on April 28, 2015, with a decision 
expected sometime in June, which looks to finally answer the question of 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to include same-sex 
couples in their definition of “marriage.” If the recent trend in federal courts is 
any indication of the likelihood of how the Supreme Court will hold, the right 
for same-sex couples to marry will be nationally recognized. The potential that 
 
 203 See supra Part II.D. 
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questions will remain unanswered is also present. Even if state bans on same-
sex marriages stand, federal schemes and systems—bankruptcy included—
must adapt. 
Moving forward, the interpretation proposed in this Article would 
potentially result in more joint filings under chapter 7 and chapter 13 of the 
Code. While some may claim that, with this increase of joint filings, creditors 
may be harmed, this does not necessarily hold true. The same limitations that 
governed heterosexual couples jointly filing would also apply to the joint 
filings of same-sex couples. So the same safeguards that are instituted in the 
Code would ensure that creditors’ interests are protected will continue to stand. 
This reading of the Code would allow the estates of same-sex couples to have 
more assets available to disburse to creditors because of the provisions of the 
Code that view marital property as an asset of the estate, whether filing jointly 
or not. This larger estate would increase the disbursement each individual 
creditor would get in either a chapter 7 or chapter 13 joint filing or individual 
filing, putting the creditors in a better posture post-discharge. 
Even if the framework propped in this Article is not adopted, bankruptcy 
courts still have alternatives that would allow same-sex couples to file jointly 
through the court’s equity powers. While bankruptcy courts have notably 
limited their use of equity powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105, the benefit of these 
joint filings for administrative ease and benefit to all interested parties 
overcomes this hesitation. This not only further promotes the “fresh start” for 
the same-sex debtors but also ensures efficiency and consolidation for the 
bankruptcy court. By further streamlining the bankruptcy process to promote 
efficiency, the resources of the bankruptcy court can now be focused on 
finding the best outcome for both the debtors and creditors rather than having 
the court enter a highly political debate on same-sex marriage. It will allow the 
court to focus on furthering the purposes of the Code. 
Overall, the framework proposed in this Article will allow bankruptcy 
filings by same-sex couples to actually reflect the realities of their economic 
condition rather than creating a legal fiction through the illusion of individual 
filings. When DOMA controlled the Code, same-sex couples had to file 
individually and contour their finances to fit within the individual filing 
requirements of the Code. However, under this Article’s framework, same-sex 
couples would be able to file a joint bankruptcy petition that outlines more 
precisely their joint property, debts, accounts, etc. The ability to file jointly, as 
a marital unit, would be a true image of the debtors’ finances as compared to 
TOMBACK GALLEYSPROOFS 7/9/2015  12:53 PM 
408 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 31 
forcing the debtors to file individually because of discriminatory definitions of 
“marriage” and “spouse.” Essentially, this framework allows for more truthful 
filings, which in turn would further promote the purposes of the bankruptcy 
system. 
Same-sex marriage will continue to sit, at least for the foreseeable future, at 
the center of heated moral, political, and legal debates in this nation. These 
debates, though, should not be so construed as to deny lawfully married 
couples the right and opportunity to jointly access the bankruptcy system. The 
protections of the Code have become increasingly more important in a time of 
economic crisis. With stories of home foreclosures and harassment by debt 
collectors on the rise, it is essential for citizens to have the chance to enjoy a 
federal system that could alleviate the burden of debt that has become far too 
common. The interpretation presented in this Article would ensure that each 
citizen would be able to utilize the Bankruptcy Code for the purpose of a 
“fresh start.” 
 
